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MILKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
LATER: THE SLOW, QUIET, AND TROUBLED DEMISE OF
LIAR LIBEL
Len Niehoff & Ashley Messenger*
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court held that there is no
separate constitutional protection for statements of opinion. It also held that an
accusation that an individual lied is a statement of fact actionable in defamation.
Lower courts have, correctly in our view, essentially ignored both holdings. In Part
I we discuss Milkovich and the infirmities in its reasoning. In Part II we discuss
the complex nature of lies and accusations of lies and argue that Milkovich failed
to account for that complexity. In Part III we discuss the strategies the lower courts
have used to steer around the problematic Milkovich decision. And in Part IV we
offer suggestions for the future direction of jurisprudence in this complicated area of
the law.
INTRODUCTION
This past year marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that an accusation that an individual lied is a statement of fact
actionable in defamation.1 In the years that have followed, the
lower courts have all but completely nullified this ruling. Milkovich
announced a major doctrinal shift by disowning the lower courts’
longstanding interpretation of Gertz v. Robert Welch2 as creating a
separate constitutional privilege for expressions of opinion. Schol-
ars have noted that this shift actually had little if any practical
impact on the disposition of defamation cases generally.3 In this
Article we go further, demonstrating that for the most part
Milkovich did not even have the narrow effect of persuading lower
courts to find accusations of lying to be factual in nature.
* Len Niehoff is a Professor from Practice at the University of Michigan Law School
and is Of Counsel to Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn. Ashley Messenger is Senior
Associate General Counsel to National Public Radio, Inc. (NPR), specializing in First
Amendment and media law. The authors thank George Barchini for his assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
1. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. See, e.g., Robert Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First Amendment: Reflections on
Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 322–25
(2000).
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The failure of Milkovich to have even this limited precedential
significance is enlightening in at least two respects. First, it offers
some insight into the complex nature of accusations of lying (and,
perhaps, of lying itself) and into the Court’s failure in Milkovich to
account for that complexity. This raises broader questions about
whether the Court in other instances has brought—and will
bring—a sufficiently nuanced approach to language, truth, and the
relationship between them. A thorough exploration of those
broader questions is beyond the scope of this article, but we hope
through our analysis to prompt further discussion along those
lines.4
Second, the post-Milkovich developments provide a case study in
how the lower courts have used a variety of strategies to avoid the
constraints of an ostensibly controlling Supreme Court opinion
that is deeply and unworkably confused. The concept of controlling
precedent has much to recommend it: recognition and reinforce-
ment of structural authority; consistency; clarity; doctrinal stability.
So whenever lower courts shrug off what appears to be a controlling
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, we should
pause to take note of how and why they did so. This may provide
us—and the Court—with lessons that extend well beyond this case
and the law of defamation.
I. MILKOVICH’S MESSY REASONING AND THE DOCTRINAL
REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T
When Milkovich was argued before the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1990 there was no reason to think that it would
affect a significant change in the law of defamation. Indeed, there
were two good reasons to think it would not.
First, the case arose from a fairly mundane series of events. In
1974, a wrestling match between two Ohio high school teams led to
an altercation and some injuries.5 As a result, Coach Michael
Milkovich’s team from Maple Heights was placed on probation and
deemed ineligible for the state tournament.6 A state athletic associa-
tion held a public investigative hearing at which Milkovich testified
4. For a discussion of the Court’s approach to language, truth, and libel law generally,
see Ashley Messenger, The Problem with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: An Argument for Moving
From a “Falsity Model” of Libel Law to a “Speech Act Model,” 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 172 (2012);
Ashley Messenger, Reflections on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 50 Years Later, 12 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 423 (2014).
5. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 4.
6. Id.
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under oath.7 After a court overturned the probation orders, re-
porter J. Theodore Diadiun wrote an exasperated column in the
sports pages of a local newspaper under the heading “Maple beat
the law with the ‘big lie.’”8 It featured a photograph of Diadiun and
the words “TD says,” with a carryover headline reading, “Diadiun
says Maple told a lie.”9 The column stated that anyone who had
attended the meet knew that Milkovich had lied about the events




10. Id. at 5 n.2. Throughout this Article we discuss the importance of the contextual
analysis of speech. It may therefore be helpful to provide the broader context around
Diadiun’s accusation of lying. In its entirety, his column stated as follows:
Yesterday in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, judge Paul Martin overturned
an Ohio High School Athletic Assn. decision to suspend the Maple Heights wrestling
team from this year’s state tournament. “It’s not final yet—the judge granted Maple
only a temporary injunction against the ruling—but unless the judge acts much more
quickly than he did in this decision (he has been deliberating since a Nov. 8 hearing)
the temporary injunction will allow Maple to compete in the tournament and make
any further discussion meaningless. But there is something much more important in-
volved here than whether Maple was denied due process by the OHSAA, the basis of
the temporary injunction. When a person takes on a job in a school, whether it be as a
teacher, coach, administrator or even maintenance worker, it is well to remember that
his primary job is that of educator. There is scarcely a person concerned with school
who doesn’t leave his mark in some way on the young people who pass his way—many
are the lessons taken away from school by students which weren’t learned from a les-
son plan or out of a book. They come from personal experiences with and
observations of their superiors and peers, from watching actions and reactions. Such a
lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple Heights
High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple–Mentor wrestling meet of last
Feb. 8. A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they learned
early. It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out. If you’re successful enough,
and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance
of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened. The teachers responsi-
ble were mainly head Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich, and former
superintendent of schools H. Donald Scott. Last winter they were faced with a difficult
situation. Milkovich’s ranting from the side of the mat and egging the crowd on
against the meet official and the opposing team backfired during a meet with Greater
Cleveland Conference rival Metor [sic ], and resulted in first the Maple Heights team,
then many of the partisan crowd attacking the Mentor squad in a brawl which sent
four Mentor wrestlers to the hospital. Naturally, when Mentor protested to the gov-
erning body of high school sports, the OHSAA, the two men were called on the carpet
to account for the incident. But they declined to walk into the hearing and face up to
their responsibilities, as one would hope a coach of Milkovich’s accomplishments and
reputation would do, and one would certainly expect from a man with the responsible
poisition [sic ] of superintendent of schools. Instead they chose to come to the hear-
ing and misrepresent the things that happened to the OHSAA Board of Control,
attempting not only to convince the board of their own innocence, but, incredibly,
shift the blame of the affair to Mentor. I was among the 2,000–plus witnesses of the
meet at which the trouble broke out, and I also attended the hearing before the OH-
SAA, so I was in a unique position of being the only non-involved party to observe
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tion.11 These circumstances—an editorial rant in a small newspaper
about a dustup at a wrestling match and a high school coach’s deni-
als—seemed an unlikely vehicle for a major First Amendment
decision.
The second reason Court observers might have assumed that
Milkovich would not be a case of great moment was that existing
doctrine appeared to dispose rather tidily of the case. In Gertz, the
Supreme Court had famously declared that “[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”12 No matter how
“pernicious an opinion may seem,” the Court announced in an
opinion authored by Justice Powell, “we depend for its correction”
on “the competition of other ideas.”13 Numerous lower courts sub-
sequently interpreted Gertz as standing for the proposition that the
First Amendment bars a plaintiff from basing a libel case on an ex-
pression of opinion. Those courts developed a multi-part language
and context-driven test for distinguishing opinions from facts.14
Applying this settled post-Gertz doctrine, the Ohio courts in
Milkovich concluded that the statement in question qualified as an
expression of opinion.15 This seemed reasonable enough. After all,
both the meet itself and the Milkovich–Scott version presented to the board. Any re-
semblance between the two occurrances [sic ] is purely coincidental. To anyone who
was at the meet, it need only be said that the Maple coach’s wild gestures during the
events leading up to the brawl were passed off by the two as ‘shrugs,’ and that
Milkovich claimed he was ‘Powerless to control the crowd’ before the melee. Fortu-
nately, it seemed at the time, the Milkovich–Scott version of the incident presented to
the board of control had enough contradictions and obvious untruths so that the six
board members were able to see through it. Probably as much in distasteful reaction
to the chicanery of the two officials as in displeasure over the actual incident, the
board then voted to suspend Maple from this year’s tournament and to put Maple
Heights, and both Milkovich and his son, Mike Jr. (the Maple Jaycee coach), on two-
year probation. But unfortunately, by the time the hearing before Judge Martin rolled
around, Milkovich and Scott apparently had their version of the incident polished and
reconstructed, and the judge apparently believed them. ‘I can say that some of the
stories told to the judge sounded pretty darned unfamiliar,’ said Dr. Harold Meyer,
commissioner of the OHSAA, who attended the hearing. ‘It certainly sounded differ-
ent from what they told us.’ Nevertheless, the judge bought their story, and ruled in
their favor. Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Men-
tor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the
hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth. But they got away
with it. Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high
school administrators and coaches? I think not.
Id.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
13. Id. at 341.
14. This understanding of Gertz was so widely accepted that it was embodied in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. c (1977). For a commonly applied version of the test
for opinion, see, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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the statement appeared in a column in the sports section, a context
typically rich in subjective criticism and invective.16 And the column
included a number of statements that seemed like expressions of a
subjective viewpoint, such as: “If you get in a jam, lie your way out. If
you’re successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sin-
cere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand
up, regardless of what really happened.”17
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to
review the case and reversed.18 In an opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the Court offered surprises both general and
particular.
At a broad doctrinal level, the Court rejected the reading of Gertz
that the lower courts had almost unanimously used for sixteen years
and announced that the Constitution affords no separate and dis-
tinct protection for expressions of opinion.19 But the Court did not
leave matters there. Relying on its decision in Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps,20 the Court observed that statements on matters
of public concern must be provably false in order to be actionable21
and acknowledged that “imaginative expression,” “loose, figurative”
language, and “rhetorical hyperbole” are not provably false.22 The
Court used as an example the statement, “In my opinion Mayor
Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of
16. The editorial mentioned both Milkovich and the former superintendent of schools,
H. Donald Scott. Scott also sued for libel, and his case was decided first. Scott v. News-Herald,
496 N.E. 2d 699 (Ohio 1986). The court ruled that the statements at issue were opinion,
following the four-part test set forth in Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979. At the time, Ollman provided
the most influential guidance on how to distinguish factual assertions from opinions. The
court considered (1) the specific language used, (2) whether the statement was verifiable, (3)
the general context of the statement, and (4) the broader context in which the statement
appeared. Id. at 706. The Scott court determined that, “the large caption ‘TD Says’ . . . would
indicate to even the most gullible reader that the article was, in fact, opinion.” Id. at 707. The
court also noted that sports pages are “a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyper-
bole.” Id. at 708. Thus, the court concluded that a reader would interpret the article as a
whole as opinion and that—while Diadiun may have made up his mind—the reader was free
to come to an alternate conclusion. Id. at 708. In light of its ruling in Scott, the Ohio Court of
Appeals ruled that Milkovich’s case was likewise meritless. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 1.
Milkovich then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
17. See supra note 10.
18. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 10.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
21. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; see also Nat Stern, The Intrinsic Character of Defamatory Content
as Grounds for a Uniform Regime of Proving Libel, 80 MISS. L.J. 1 (2010) (evaluating the Court’s
use of Hepps in Milkovich and discussing what should be required to prove defamatory
falsehood).
22. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20–21.
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Marx and Lenin.”23 The Court found that this “would not be action-
able” because it could not “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual.”24
At a more granular level, the Court rather breezily concluded
that the statement at issue in this case was an assertion of fact.25 The
Court’s analysis in this regard warrants quoting and discussing at
some length, because in our view it explains much of the confusion
and skepticism reflected in the subsequent lower court decisions:
If a speaker says, ‘In my opinion John Jones is a liar,’ he im-
plies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that
Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon
which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect
or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the
statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply
couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel
these implications; and the statement, ‘In my opinion Jones is
a liar,’ can cause as much damage to reputation as the state-
ment, ‘Jones is a liar.’ As Judge Friendly aptly stated: ‘[It]
would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape
liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by us-
ing, explicitly or implicitly, the words “I think.”26
This analysis is problematic in a number of respects.
First, it is hard to know what to make of the Court’s observation
that a statement might damage a person’s reputation even if modi-
fied by the phrase “in my opinion.”27 This may be correct, but it is
beside the point. Many types of statements that the law deems non-
actionable (and that Milkovich recognizes as such)—including true
statements and statements of “rhetorical hyperbole”28—are capable
of injuring someone’s reputation.29 Besides, the post-Gertz lower
court decisions did not immunize opinions on the basis that they
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
25. Id. at 21.
26. Id. at 18–19.
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 20.
29. For example, courts have protected statements referring to a person as a “loser” or a
“skank.” See, e.g., Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 117 (2002). Such
name-calling undoubtedly casts the subject in a negative light and could cause harm to one’s
reputation. Nevertheless, these terms have no definable meaning and cannot be proven true
or false. They reflect only the opinion of the speaker, and there is no credible argument that
they are quantifiable or measurable in any evidentiary manner. These kinds of statements are
called “insults”—statements that hurt feelings and could potentially harm reputation, but
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could do no harm. Rather, the courts did so on the basis that such
statements express ideas instead of facts and that the First Amend-
ment provides an extraordinarily high level of protection to the
former.30
Second, no one (including the defendants in Milkovich) inter-
preted Gertz as standing for the simple-minded proposition that
adding the phrase “I think” or “in my opinion” to a sentence magi-
cally and in-and-of-itself transformed a statement of fact into
something else. For example, standing on its own, “in my opinion,
on December 2, 2014, John Jones committed an armed robbery of
the bank on the corner of Main and Liberty streets” so reeks of
factual significance as to raise questions about whether the initial
disclaiming phrase has any meaning at all. When the Court de-
clared that no linguistic alchemy was achieved through the simple
addition, without more, of “in my opinion” it rebutted an argument
that no advocate or scholarly commentator had seriously
advanced.31
Third, the Court’s analysis seriously misstated the law of “fair
comment,” under which conclusions are insulated from liability if
the premises allegedly supporting them are fully disclosed and
true.32 Under the fair comment doctrine, the following statement
would be insulated from liability (if all the premises are correct)
because the reader or listener would be free to make his or her own
judgment and to agree or disagree with the conclusion:
I work with John Jones; I see him every morning at eight when
he comes to work and every evening at five when he leaves; he
always has with him a brown paper bag with some sort of bottle
in it; his breath smells of alcohol when I see him; therefore, I
think John has a drinking problem.
Some people might agree that these premises support the conclu-
sion. Others might disagree, for example contending that John
might be taking a rinse of alcohol-infused mouthwash at eight and
lack inherent meaning and reflect the hurtful motivations of the speaker. See generally WIL-
LIAM B. IRVINE, A SLAP IN THE FACE: WHY INSULTS HURT—AND WHY THEY SHOULDN’T (Oxford
Univ. Press 2013).
30. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. This is not to say that phrases like “in my opinion” or “I believe” are without signifi-
cance. To the contrary, in certain contexts they can provide important clarity regarding the
certainty with which speaker purports to be speaking. The Supreme Court recently recog-
nized as much in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indust. Pension Fund, 135
U.S. 1318 (2015) (holding in a Securities Act case that statements of belief regarding legal
compliance were “pure statements of opinion” and not statements of objective fact).
32. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
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five to keep his breath minty fresh. But it makes no sense to say, as
the Court does, that the fair comment privilege turns on whether
the speaker’s “assessment” of the facts is “erroneous.”33 The whole
point of the doctrine is to give speakers room to express their views
when they tell us the bases for them and to protect those speakers
from liability based on differing subjective judgments.34
Fourth, and for purposes of this article most importantly, the
Court’s reasoning is troublesome because it suggests that all accusa-
tions of lying are identical and that all of them constitute assertions
of fact. Consider the stark example that the Court chooses: “In my
opinion John Jones is a liar.”35 The Court declares that this state-
ment necessarily and inherently “implies” that the speaker knows of
undisclosed facts supporting this opinion.36 From this implication,
the Court concludes that the statement is itself factual.37
But this is profoundly confused. In order to understand what this
statement implies (and what the audience would make of it) we
would need to know more about its context. For example, it would
not seem even remotely obvious that the statement implied a
knowledge of specific underlying facts if the statement were made
in response to John Jones’s prediction that he will someday run for
President of the United States, or to John Jones’s criticism that
someone under his supervision wears ugly ties, or to John Jones’s
boast that he is the best point guard on his neighborhood basket-
ball team. To the contrary, in these contexts the opinion might rest
on nothing more than hunches, guesses about probabilities, or
even other opinions.
It is perhaps understandable that the Milkovich Court made such
a sweeping generalization about the statement, “In my opinion
John Jones is a liar.”38 After all, the Court had in mind the facts of
the case before it, and Diadiun had stated in his column that he
had attended both the wrestling meet and the athletic commission
hearing and that this put him in the “unique position” of assessing
what occurred.39 Nevertheless, the generalization is wrong. Does “In
my opinion John Jones is a liar”40 imply knowledge of supporting
33. Id.
34. For a more complete analysis of this issue see Leonard M. Niehoff, Opinions, Implica-
tions, and Confusions, 28 COMM. LAW. 19, Nov. 2011, http://www.honigman.com/media/
site_files/1601_Niehoff_opinions_implications_confusions.pdf.




39. Id. at 5 n.2.
40. Id. at 18.
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facts? Without more details about context the question is unanswer-
able—and the Supreme Court therefore should not have answered
it.
Of course, in the end the Court concluded that Diadiun’s accusa-
tion of lying was actionable.41 The Court held that a “reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun col-
umn imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself
in a judicial proceeding.”42 The Court reasoned that “This is not the
sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate
the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining that peti-
tioner committed the crime of perjury.”43 “Nor,” the Court held,
“does the general tenor of the article negate this impression.”44
What became of Milkovich? Not much. Despite its broad and dra-
matic disavowal of the longstanding opinion doctrine, Milkovich
made almost no difference to the trajectory of defamation law. Af-
ter all, the Court’s recognition of protection for “imaginative
expression,” “loose, figurative” language, and “rhetorical hyper-
bole”45 offered an alternative strategy to defendants in defamation
cases. In response to Milkovich, media lawyers resorted to the simple
expedient of substituting “rhetorical hyperbole” for “opinion” in
their briefs.46 And most courts that later considered such cases ap-
plied the same standard they had previously applied and “reached
the result that they likely would have before the Supreme Court
decided [Milkovich].”47 Milkovich thus had little, if any, effect on the
broad contours of libel doctrine.
Additionally, and perhaps more surprisingly, the specific ruling
in Milkovich that Diadiun’s accusation of lying was a statement of
fact has had virtually no precedential effect. And the same holds
true for the Court’s broader suggestion that accusations of lying
generally—like the decontextualized statement “In my opinion
John Jones is liar”—are factual in nature.48 Given that specific rul-
ing, and that expansive suggestion, we might anticipate that lower
courts would almost always conclude that accusations of lying were
factual. After all, Milkovich reached this decision with respect to a




45. Id. at 20–21.
46. See infra Conclusion; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
47. Sack, supra note 3. Indeed, “[i]t could even be argued that Milkovich actually ex-
panded First Amendment protections by adopting an analysis that embraced not just
opinions, but also ‘imaginative expression’ and other forms of ‘loose, figurative, or hyper-
bolic language.’” Niehoff, supra note 34, at 20.
48. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 2.
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statement that (a) used fairly strident language, as editorials tend to
do, (b) followed the caption “TD Says,” which signaled that it ex-
pressed one individual’s opinions, and (c) appeared in the sports
pages, a context heavily populated by loose, figurative, and hyper-
bolic speech.49 As we will show, however, things have not played out
this way. To the contrary, since Milkovich, many courts have con-
cluded that an accusation of lying was not an actionable statement
of fact.
II. THE COMPLEX NATURE OF LIES AND ACCUSATIONS OF LIES
As noted above, the Milkovich Court’s suggestion that even a sim-
ple accusation of lying (such as “In my opinion John Jones is a liar”)
is factual in nature50 does not sufficiently attend to the importance
of context. The meaning of an accusation of lying, perhaps even
the meaning of lying itself, can change depending upon the
speaker, the audience, the setting, the medium, the cultural envi-
ronment, and a host of other factors. This is easily demonstrated by
a review of three recent, conspicuous, and widely discussed exam-
ples of accusations of lying. In this respect, there is some irony to
the fact that the years after Milkovich were a boom time for high
profile accusations of lying.
In September 2009, Representative Joe Wilson attracted national
attention when he interrupted President Barack Obama’s speech to
a joint session of Congress by calling out, “You lie!”51 The House
subsequently voted (along party lines) to admonish Wilson for his
“breach of decorum,” but did not suggest that he had said some-
thing factually false about the President.52 Wilson apologized for his
violation of “protocol,” but grumbled about the apparent double
standard in light of instances where Democrats had booed Presi-
dent Bush.53 Wilson thus saw his accusation of lying as being, in
every relevant sense, just like any other boorish expression of disap-
proval. “You lie!” was the functional equivalent of hissing, turning
his back, or sticking his thumbs in his ears and humming.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Kate Phillips, House Admonishes Wilson on Outburst, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Sept. 15,
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In September 2012, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
accused Judge Richard Posner, who sits on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, of lying in a book review.54 This
resulted in counter-charges of mischaracterizations. We discuss this
example at length because the details help underscore the impor-
tance of context.
Scalia and co-author Bryan Garner published a book, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, discussing Scalia’s approach to
constitutional originalism.55 Posner reviewed the book in the Sep-
tember 13, 2012 issue of The New Republic.56 In the review, Posner
said “when [Justice Scalia] looks for the original meaning of eight-
eenth-century constitutional provisions—as he did in District of
Columbia v. Heller, holding that an ordinance forbidding people to
own handguns even for the defense of their homes violated the Sec-
ond Amendment—Scalia is doing legislative history.”57
In a later interview, when asked about this critique, Scalia said:
[O]nly in writing for a non-legal audience could [Posner]
have made that argument. Because any legal audience knows
what legislative history is. It’s the history of the enactment of
the bill. It’s the floor speeches. It’s the prior drafts of commit-
tees. That’s what legislative history is. It isn’t the history of the
times. It’s not what people thought it meant immediately after
its enactment. It’s not what laws were—were continued in ef-
fect despite this. That—that is simply not legislative history . . .
And to say that I use legislative history in how—is—is simply,
to put it bluntly, a lie. And—you can get away with it in the
New Republic I suppose, but . . . not to a legal audience.58
The New Republic published Posner’s response on its web-
site.59 Posner alleged that Scalia’s remarks were based on a
54. Terry Baynes, Fanning furor, Justice Scalia says appeals court judge lied, REUTERS (Sept.
17, 2012) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-usa-court-scalia-idUSBRE
88H06X20120918.
55. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
56. Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, But the Letter Giveth Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13,




58. Richard A. Posner, Richard Posner Responds to Antonin Scalia’s Accusation of Lying, NEW
REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/107549/richard-posner-re
sponds-antonin-scalias-accusation-lying.
59. Id.
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mischaracterization of what Posner had said.60 But Posner further
contended that, had he said such things, he would not have been
lying:
Even if I accepted Scalia’s narrow definition of “legislative his-
tory” and applied it to his opinion in Heller, I would not be
telling a “lie.” For Justice Scalia does discuss the “drafting his-
tory” (legislative history in its narrowest sense) of the Second
Amendment. See 554 U.S. 598–599, 603–605.
So I would not have been lying, or even mistaken, had I said
in my book review that in Heller Scalia “actually resorts” to “leg-
islative history” in its narrowest sense (“drafting history”). But I
did not say that.61
Of course, Posner’s rebuttal can also be construed as an accusa-
tion of lying—a charge that Scalia had deliberately misstated the
truth about his critique. But no reasonable person expected law-
suits and counterclaims to come from this exchange. Everyone
understood that this is the sort of thing you get when outspoken
and touchy judges get on each other’s nerves.
Nor would it be fair to characterize either of these accusations of
lying as carrying with them implications of undisclosed facts. To the
contrary, both Scalia and Posner expressed their views and also
their bases for them. And those bases included a wide array of non-
factual matter, including competing opinions about what the word
“history” means.62 Although this incident never resulted in litiga-
tion, we suspect that if it had, it would have been quickly disposed
of on the grounds that the statements at issue are conclusions
drawn from stated facts and therefore protected by the First
Amendment—an approach that courts have used in many cases, as
discussed further below.
Another drama that is playing out as this Article was being writ-
ten includes countless charges and counter-charges of lying. In
recent years, accusations have emerged that actor and comedian
Bill Cosby drugged and raped numerous women.63 In October
2014, comedian Hannibal Buress referred to Cosby as a rapist dur-




63. Todd Leopold & Ben Brumfield, Rape Allegations Haunt Bill Cosby in the Digital Age,
CNN (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/14/showbiz/tv/bill-cosby-rape-allega
tions/.
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performance went viral on social media.64 The allegations against
Cosby had been the subject of a 2005 civil suit, and a couple of
women had publicly made claims against him in the past, but he
had never been charged with a crime and the public did not take
much notice.65 After the Buress video became popular, however,
dozens of women came forward with similar stories about being
drugged and raped by Cosby.66 Cosby himself did not address the
allegations, but his lawyer, Marty Singer, said that the accusations
were an “inane yarn” of “fabricated stories”67 and other Cosby sup-
porters have made similar statements.68 Cosby’s accusers have stood
by their stories, which might reasonably be understood as a recipro-
cal charge that his supporters are lying. As of the writing of this
Article, there are four separate defamation lawsuits filed by at least
ten women, alleging that Cosby is liable for suggesting they are li-
ars.69 At least one of those cases has survived a defense motion to
dismiss.70
Of course, the Cosby accusations seem different from those of
Wilson and Scalia. We might dismiss Wilson’s accusation as a burst
of heated rhetoric. And we might shrug off Scalia’s (and Posner’s?)
accusations as an overstated disagreement about the meaning of
texts that are available to all of us to assess and evaluate on our own.
(Did Posner lie? Read Scalia’s book and decide for yourself. Did
Scalia lie? Read Posner’s rebuttal and see what you think.) In the
Cosby case, however, it seems certain that someone is lying. And it
seems clear that some people are in a better position than others to
know who it is. The Cosby accusations are thus not only different
from those at issue in the Wilson and Scalia/Posner cases: they are
different as among themselves.
64. Dan McQuade, Hannibal Buress on Bill Cosby: “You’re a Rapist,” PHILA. MAG. (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.phillymag.com/ticket/2014/10/17/hannibal-buress-bill-cosby-rapist/
#ZfGw7D5EsvUTRQ5l.01.
65. Leopold & Brumfield, supra note 63.
66. Noreen Malone, ‘I’m No Longer Afraid’: 35 Women Tell Their Stories About Bill Cosby, and
the Culture That Wouldn’t Listen, N.Y. MAG, July 27, 2015.
67. Aaron Couch, Bill Cosby’s Lawyer Fires Back at Accusers: “This Is Utter Nonsense,”
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/bill-cosbys-law
yer-fires-back-751015; Cynthia Littleton, Bill Cosby Lawyer Disputes Janice Dickinson’s Rape Claim,
VARIETY (Nov. 19, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/tv/news/bill-cosby-lawyer-disputes-janice-
dickinsons-rape-claim-1201360149/.
68. Lynette Rice, Bill Cosby Breaks Silence to Thank Supporters, PEOPLE (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.people.com/article/bill-cosby-thanks-whoopi-goldberg-jill-scott.
69. See Sydney Ember & Graham Bowley, Defamation Suits Against Cosby Point to Peril of
Belittling Accusers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/busi
ness/media/defamation-suits-against-cosby-point-to-peril-of-belittling-accusers.html.
70. See Graham Bowley & Sydney Ember, Defamation Suit Against Bill Cosby Will Go Forward
in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/business/
defamation-suit-against-cosby-will-go-forward-in-massachusetts.html?_r=0.
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Cosby and the women who have accused him of drugging and
raping them are in a position to know who is telling the truth.
When one of those accusers charges that Cosby is lying we under-
stand her to be saying, “I was there; I know; this man is not telling
the truth about what happened.” On the other hand, Cosby’s law-
yer, wife, and other defenders were not in the room(s) when the
alleged events occurred. They cannot have a personal, empirical
basis for charging Cosby’s accusers with lying—and we all get that.
We recognize that when Cosby’s lawyer says these women have
“fabricated stories”71 what he is really saying is that he believes his
client’s version over the versions of his accusers (and, of course, we
also recognize that he gets paid to do so). When the rest of us—
spectators to these events—express our own views (“Cosby is lying”
or “His accusers are in it for a shakedown”) we are doing the same
thing.72
Just as accusing someone of lying is a complicated enterprise, so
is lying itself. A thorough taxonomy of lying is well beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is appropriate to provide some sense of
the wide array of activities we describe when we use the word “lie.”
This helps account for some of the texture we discover in accusa-
tions of lying.
Lies obviously include deliberate misstatements of fact, where the
speaker’s intention is to mislead—what Sissela Bok calls “clear-cut
lies.”73 If John accuses Jane of lying in this strong sense, then he is
charging her with knowingly saying something false, perhaps to fur-
ther her own agenda. A lie in this sense corresponds to our legal
71. Couch, supra note 67.
72. Another example is the statement “Bush lied” about weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq. A speaker who makes such a statement is simply expressing his opinion that President
Bush misrepresented facts in order to engage in a war in Iraq. The audience cannot reasona-
bly believe the speaker (assuming it is not someone in the Bush administration who worked
closely on this issue) would have any personal knowledge of the events. The speaker is draw-
ing conclusions based on the publicly disclosed facts that are available to all to evaluate. Even
if people draw different conclusions, one cannot infer that the speaker has specialized knowl-
edge of Bush’s state of mind. See ASHLEY MESSENGER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MEDIA LAW 33
(Pearson 2014). It should be noted that there is an additional issue with respect to libel cases
based on allegations of rape or sexual assault: the question of consent may give rise to further
defenses or considerations. Indeed, people have different opinions about what constitutes
evidence of consent. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape.html (discussing
the difference between positive consent and implied consent and how power relationships
affect the validity of consent).
73. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 16 (1999) (describ-
ing “clear-cut lies” as “lies where the intention to mislead is obvious, where the liar knows that
what he is communicating is not what he believes, and where he has not deluded himself into
believing his own deceits”).
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concept of a fraud, an intentional misrepresentation made for
some sort of gain.
But we may also use “lie” to describe statements that we know to
be false, even if we are unsure about the motivations of the speaker.
Say, for example, that John knows that Sam cannot drink alcohol
for medical reasons. It has come to his attention that Jane made the
following statement to their mutual supervisor: “You know Sam and
that group from plant operations? I saw the guys drinking on the
job.” In response, John goes to the boss and says: “I am not sure why
she did it, but Jane lied about Sam.”
Of course, Jane might be able to explain her misstatement. Per-
haps she mistook someone else for Sam or misspoke when she used
Sam’s name or meant to convey that the men with Sam were drink-
ing—not Sam himself. But when John makes his statement he does
not know any of this. What he does know is that Sam cannot drink
and what he believes is that anyone who says Sam is drinking on the
job is acting irresponsibly—perhaps intentionally, perhaps negli-
gently. Such a misstatement is a lie in John’s book, and he calls it
such.
But it gets more complicated still, because while some lies are
intentional and malicious, and some are sloppy or reckless, still
others are morally neutral if not even virtuous. Under some circum-
stances speakers may consider their lies defensible, perhaps even
morally compelled.74 In such situations, a speaker intends to
deceive, but believes that there are “good reasons” to do so.75 This
includes the category we call “white lies,”76 which are usually of-
fered in situations where a speaker determines that the deception is
unlikely to cause harm.77 At the far end of the spectrum, lies be-
come not just excusable but justifiable, for example where they may
relieve suffering or save a life.78
74. Id. at xxxiii.
75. Id. at xxxiii (“Rather, I want to stress the more vexing dilemmas of ordinary life;
dilemmas which beset those who think that their lies are too insignificant to matter much,
and others who believe that lying can protect someone or benefit society. We need to look
most searchingly, not at what we would all reject as unconscionable, but at those cases where
many see good reasons to lie.”).
76. Id. at 58 (defining a white lie as “a falsehood not meant to injure anyone, and of
little moral import”).
77. Id. at 58.
78. See id. at 91, 140–45, 108 (discussing the example of parents who might choose to lie
to a terminally ill child in order to minimize the child’s anguish). See also Robert C. Solomon,
Is It Ever Right to Lie? The Philosophy of Deception, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 27, 1998, at A60
(“Not all untruths are malicious. Telling the truth can complicate or destroy social relation-
ships. It can undermine precious collective myths. Honesty can be cruel. Sometimes,
deception is not a vice but a social virtue, and systematic deception is an essential part of the
order of the (social) world. In many countries—Japan and Western Samoa, for example—
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In addition, it is even possible to make a false statement, knowing
it is false, that we do not label a lie. Philosopher Joel Marks gives
this example:
Is it possible to utter a falsehood and yet not lie? Suppose I say
to you, ‘The Earth is flat.’ This statement is false. But I am not
lying. I know it’s false, and I know you know it’s false. I have
only uttered it in order to make my point: It is possible to utter
a falsehood and yet not lie.79
He notes that lying is not really about literal truth or falsity.80 It is
about belief and intention.81
As this discussion shows, accusations of lying can differ dramati-
cally in what they mean and how we understand them.82 They are
not a category of speech but a collection of categories. Generalized
pronouncements about them, like those offered in Milkovich, there-
fore do not adequately capture their complexity. As we will discuss,
these nuances have not been lost on the lower courts.
This is not to say that what emerges from the lower court deci-
sions is a body of doctrine that is entirely consistent, coherent, or
correct. To the contrary, the lower court jurisprudence around this
issue is less tidy than one might hope. But the lower court decisions
cast considerable light on where Milkovich went wrong and on what
it means—or the range of things it might mean—when someone
says that someone else lied.
III. APRÈS MILKOVICH LE DÉLUGE: LIAR CASES IN
THE LOWER COURTS
Lots of post-Milkovich defamation cases involved accusations that
someone lied. In many of them, the court concluded that the state-
ment was not actionable. The reasoning behind that conclusion
varied and offers insight into how lower courts avoid problematic
social harmony is valued far more than truthfulness as such. To tell another person what he
or she wants to hear, rather than what one might actually feel or believe, is not only permit-
ted but expected.”).




82. Even among philosophers who have attempted to define “lying,” there is significant
disagreement. See Andreas Stokke, Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 348,
348–59 (2013) (giving examples of different views on lying); see also Don Fallis, Lying and
Deception, 10 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1, 1–22 (2010) (discussing differing views on the condi-
tions for lying).
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Supreme Court precedent: by ignoring it; by co-opting it; and by
distinguishing it. We can divide the cases into several categories
along those lines.83
A. Ignoring Milkovich: The Opinion Cases
The first category is remarkable because these cases proceed as
though Milkovich did not exist. These courts apply the post-Gertz
pre-Milkovich opinion analysis as if it had persisted uninterrupted.
We will call these the “opinion cases.” They are relatively few in
number.
Gill v. Delaware Park, LLC is a good example of an opinion case.84
There, the owner of a large number of thoroughbred racehorses
83. We omit from our discussion those cases that do not engage with the substantive
question of whether the accusation was factual in nature and that are resolved on other
grounds. These decisions turn on other principles of libel law (for example that the state-
ment was substantially true or that the plaintiff could not prove actual malice) and do not
inform our analysis. See, e.g., Konrad v. Brown, 937 N.Y.S.2d 190 (2012) (finding statements
to be “substantially true”); Swisher v. Collins, No. 2009 WL 1658031 (D. Idaho June 11, 2009)
(statements are true, or supported conclusions); Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d
128 (D.D.C. 2009) (no evidence of actual malice); Foxworthy v. Buetow, 492 F. Supp. 2d 974
(S.D. Ind. 2007) (statement is not defamation per se, and there is no evidence of special
damages); Carver v. Bonds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480 (2005) (statements are either substantially
true or supported by fair report privilege); Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 885 A.2d 496 (App. Div.
2005) (no evidence of actual malice); S. Volkswagen, Inc. v. Centrix Fin., LLC, 357 F. Supp.
2d 837 (D. Md. 2005) (dismissed on technical grounds); Lowe v. City of Shelton, 851 A.2d
1183 (2004) (statement was retracted); Anderson v. The Augusta Chronicle, 585 S.E.2d 506
(Ct. App. 2003) (no evidence of actual malice); Kling v. Harris Teeter Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d
667 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (not actionable because statement was not heard by a third party);
Ampleman v. Scheweppe, 972 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (statement has innocent
construction; saying that statement was “inaccurate” does not necessarily mean plaintiff lied;
it could mean there was an error, which is not defamatory); Curry v. Roman, 217 A.D.2d 314
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (no evidence of actual malice); Piersall v. SportsVision of Chicago, 595
N.E.2d 103 (1992) (no evidence of actual malice). Perhaps the most important “liar” case
decided on other grounds is Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc., Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1977). That case established the “neutral reportage” defense in the Second Circuit, and it was
decided pre-Milkovich, so it is not relevant to our analysis here. Id. at 120. Nevertheless, it is
consistent with the point we will make later that there are good reasons to protect allegations
that one is a “liar.” This Article also does not discuss the decisions of those state courts that
have invoked a state constitutional provision in rejecting the reasoning of Milkovich or apply-
ing greater protection to opinion. See Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n, 508 N.W.2d 917
(1993); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (1991); Vail v. The Plain Dealer
Publ’g Co., 649 N.E.2d 182 (1995); Magnusson v. New York Times Co., 2004 OK 53, 98 P.3d
1070; Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992). Again, those cases are
not directly relevant to our thesis.
84. Gill v. Delaware Park, LLC, 294 F. Supp. 2d 638 (D. Del. 2003); see also Mast v. Over-
son, 971 P.2d 928, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding, without discussing Milkovich, that an
accusation of misrepresentation in the context of a heated public debate would be taken
“with a grain of salt”).
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brought a defamation claim based on statements made in a Wash-
ington Post article about him and his controversial practices within
the sport.85 In the article, the plaintiff described an instance in
which an official of the defendant track threatened to terminate
the plaintiff’s ability to race his horses at that facility if he persisted
in those practices.86 The track official denied that the conversation
took place and called the plaintiff a “liar.”87 The plaintiff alleged he
was defamed by this accusation.88
Under a strict reading of Milkovich, the accusation might appear
to be factual in nature. After all, the conversation either did or did
not take place and the threat either was or was not made. Further-
more, the individual denying that it took place had personal
knowledge of whether it had occurred.
But the lower court would have none of this. Using the pre-
Milkovich language of “opinion” and the pre-Milkovich test and offer-
ing no discussion of Milkovich at all, the court concluded that in
context the accusation was not actionable.89 The court reasoned
that readers of the article would understand that the plaintiff and
the defendant were enmeshed in a heated disagreement over
whether a particular conversation took place and what had been
said in the course of it.90 In this context, the court concluded, read-
ers would be much more likely to view “liar” as an epithet than as a
factual statement.91
The court’s departure from the strict dictates of Milkovich seems
appropriate here. After all, most of us would acknowledge that indi-
vidual memories about specific conversations are often imperfect
for a variety of reasons: there may have been a misunderstanding
about what was being said and being heard right from the begin-
ning; a variety of psychological and cognitive factors and biases may
shape what we remember and how we remember it; self-interest
may, consciously or unconsciously, move our recollection in one
direction or another; and so on. When one person says that an-
other “lied” about a conversation, we understand that this often
means: “I sure don’t remember that the same way he does and I
think he is wrong.” In calling it a “lie,” the accuser is frequently
making a claim to certainty that may be overstated and unwar-
ranted, and the audience understands that. An accusation of lying
85. Gill, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 640–42.
86. Id. at 642.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 647.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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in this context is an exaggerative argumentative device, as when
lawyers in their briefs say that something is “clearly” or “obviously”
true even though it is not nearly so plain.
B. Co-opting Milkovich: The Rhetorical Hyperbole Cases
The cases in the second category show a somewhat greater fealty
to Milkovich than do the opinion cases. In these cases, the lower
court cites Milkovich, invokes the concept of “rhetorical hyper-
bole,”92 and usually rules that in context the accusation of lying is
not an assertion of fact capable of being proven true or false. We
will call these the “rhetorical hyperbole cases.” They differ from the
opinion cases more in form than in substance. Having given a tip of
the hat to Milkovich’s shift from opinion to rhetorical hyperbole,
the courts here generally proceed to apply exactly the same sort of
contextual analysis employed after Gertz.
Consider, for example, Wood v. Del Giorno.93 In that case, two indi-
viduals—Del Giorno, an avid outdoorsman, and Wood, an animal
rights advocate—participated in a broadcast radio debate about
“canned hunts.”94 The conversation became heated and rude,
voices were raised and sentences interrupted, and Del Giorno ac-
cused Wood of being a “fraud” (and, as if that were not enough, a
“complete fraud”) who was “out-and-out lying.”95 Wood sued, the
trial court granted summary judgment to Del Giorno, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.96 The Court of Appeals cited Milkovich
in concluding that these accusations were “merely opinions or hy-
perbole, rather than facts” and that no “reasonable person listening
to the show [would] believe that Del Giorno was actually accusing
Wood of engaging in fraudulent behavior.”97
One might wonder how a court could conclude that no reasona-
ble person could believe that when you call someone a “complete
fraud”98 you are not charging them with, well, being a fraud—a
“clear-cut liar” in the strong sense discussed above.99 Taken literally,
the accusation seems to do just that. And Milkovich certainly left
enough room for a court to conclude that an accusation of fraud is
92. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
93. Wood v. Del Giorno, 974 So.2d 95 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
94. Id. at 97.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 97–98.
97. Id. at 99.
98. Id. at 97.
99. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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factual in nature, charging the target with intentionally misleading
others for the speaker’s own advantage.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that this case was correctly decided. A
review of the speech in context supports the court’s conclusion that
listeners of the program would have understood that they were
hearing the sort of heated, overwrought debate in which such lan-
guage is to be taken with a “grain of salt.”100 Debates over animal
rights and hunting tend to get very hot very fast and are frequently
driven by invective and overstatement. Surely no one tuning into a
screaming match over the subject suffered from the illusion that
they were listening to an exchange characterized by objective data
and factual precision.101
The good news about the first and second category of cases is
that they preserve the values of continuity and predictability within
the jurisprudence. In both the opinion cases and the rhetorical hy-
perbole cases, the courts default to the language- and context-
driven mode of analysis developed after Gertz. Thus, for example, in
Gill the court relied upon a pre-Milkovich 1981 opinion case from
California to analyze the statement before it.102 This reliance on the
post-Gertz standard has resulted in more doctrinal consistency than
we might have hoped for in light of the fact that Milkovich does not
tell us much about what hyperbole is or how we know it when we
see it.
C. Distinguishing Milkovich: Cases Involving Conclusions Based on
Disclosed Facts
There is a third category of cases in which the courts have also
overwhelmingly found accusations of lying to be non-actionable. In
these cases, the courts found that the statements at issue were con-
clusions based on disclosed facts. Because the facts were known and
the audience could decide for itself whether the speaker’s conclu-
sion was valid, the courts protected these statements as opinion
under the fair comment doctrine discussed above.
100. See Wood, 974 So.2d at 99; Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
101. See also Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does 1 Through 20, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16277,
at *6–*8 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2003) (subpoena to identify Doe plaintiffs in defamation case
quashed because accusations of “lies” and “half truths” made on Yahoo message board were,
in context, mere hyperbole); LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d 516, 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) (commentary regarding plaintiff’s “lies and deception” were rhetorical
hyperbole).
102. Okun v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 1369 (Cal. 1981).
WINTER 2016] The Demise of Liar Libel 487
An example is Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications.103 In
that case, plaintiff, a touring company that produced a musical
comedy version of “Phantom of the Opera,” sued defendant, pub-
lisher of the Boston Globe, over an article suggesting that the
marketing of the production was intended to mislead potential at-
tendees into believing that they would see the famously popular
Andrew Lloyd Weber version of the story—which this decidedly was
not.104
The court noted that the author of the piece in question had
disclosed all of the facts on which he based his conclusion and that
those facts were true.105 Consistent with the fair comment doctrine,
the court held his conclusion to be non-actionable because the un-
derlying facts were accessible to everyone and readers were invited
to make their own judgment.106 On this basis the court distin-
guished Milkovich. There, the reporter could reasonably have been
understood to have factual bases for his view beyond those known
by the reader.107 It is notable that the lower courts have used the
fair comment privilege correctly to dispose of some post-Milkovich
cases, because, as discussed above, Milkovich almost certainly de-
scribed that principle incorrectly.108
D. Following Milkovich: Bad Law Making More Bad Law
The final category consists of those cases in which courts have
followed Milkovich’s general lead in finding an accusation of lying to
be factual in nature. McNamee v. Clemens109 is a good example.110
McNamee was an athletic trainer for the New York Yankees.111 He
testified before Congress that he had injected famed baseball player
Roger Clemens with performance enhancing drugs.112 Clemens
then called McNamee a “liar” and McNamee sued for libel.113 The
103. Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1992); see also
USA Technologies, Inc. v. Doe, 713 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Ferris v. Loyal Order of
Moose Oneonta Lodge No. 465, 686 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. 1999); Krems v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleve-
land, 726 N.E.2d 1016 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
104. Phantom Touring, Inc., 953 F.2d at 725.
105. Id. at 730.
106. Id. at 730–31; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990).
107. Phantom Touring, Inc., 953 F.2d at 730–31.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
109. McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
110. See also Leal v. Holtvogt, 702 N.E.2d 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Kolegas v. Heftel
Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. 1992); Divet v. Reinisch, 564 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. 1991).
111. McNamee, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 589–90.
112. Id. at 589–90, 592.
113. Id. at 599.
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court reasoned that the accusation was factual: McNamee either did
or did not inject Clemens with drugs, and thus the allegation that
McNamee had lied could be proven true or false.114 There are sev-
eral factors that distinguish these types of cases from the others: (1)
the subject matter of the statement is, at least theoretically, quantifi-
able or provable, as opposed to a characterization of events or
conclusion about events; (2) the parties to the case were the actual
participants in the event and therefore should be in a position to
know what happened and have a valid epistemological basis for
their statements;115 and (3) there is little room for interpretation
about what the meaning or motivation of the statement is—as op-
posed to statements that are hyperbolic or made in the heat of an
argument.
Cases like McNamee are not particularly unsettling—but those
that follow Milkovich’s more specific suggestion that an opinion is
actionable if it implies knowledge of supporting facts are. Take, for
instance, Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc., a case involv-
ing a dispute over the ownership of real estate.116 The court there
held, without elaboration, that the defendant’s statement that the
plaintiff won the property through “lies and deceit” was actionable
because it implied unstated facts.117 The statements at issue were
part of a long-running and bitter dispute over property, and in this
context the court could easily have found that the accusation was
hyperbolic and not to be taken literally—as did the courts in the
first and second categories discussed above—but it did not.118
This sort of wooden application of Milkovich is dangerous. While
the basis for the speaker’s statement was unknown to the audience,
114. Id. at 602. The case settled in March of 2015. See Nathaniel Vinton, Michael O’Keefe
& Teri Thompson, Roger Clemens pays Brian McNamee to settle defamation suit, putting end to seven-
year war, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2015, 6:07 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-
team/brian-mcnamee-defamation-suit-roger-clemens-settled-article-1.2154565.
115. We should note, however, that the fact that parties were participants in events does
not guarantee that they have knowledge of what occurred or that the basis for their beliefs
about what occurred is valid. A person could have been drunk or otherwise impaired,
misheard a statement or misunderstood what was occurring, or simply have misremembered
or confused events. In fact, it may be that the speaker may make an erroneous statement
about an event in which he was involved and yet he may in good faith believe he is correct,
and thus, he may not have acted with “actual malice” for the purposes of libel law. Our point
is not that this factor should necessarily indicate liability, but that it is a pre-condition to
liability. One cannot transfer “knowledge” that one does not have. Thus, if a person speaks
about an event at which he was not present and the audience cannot plausibly believe the
speaker has a basis for the statement, then a court should deem it to be “opinion” and non-
actionable. See infra Part IV.A.
116. Brach v. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc., 265 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 1999).
117. Id. at 360–61.
118. See id. at 361.
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one cannot assume that there must be some fact at issue (which
would be provable as false) as opposed to a characterization of facts
(which would be an opinion about which reasonable people can
disagree). Such an approach ignores both the practical reality that
speakers can be and often are hasty and imprecise, and also the
obligation of the audience to evaluate the credibility of the speaker
and ask for clarity in cases where statements and their factual basis
are ambiguous.119 Most, perhaps all, accusations of lies will be
found actionable if we pay no attention to the complexities of lan-
guage, understanding, and context and if our analysis begins and
ends with the question of whether someone might think that the
accusation was informed by undisclosed facts. Indeed, it is a curious
jurisprudence that suggests a speaker’s best refuge might be to de-
clare: “In my opinion Jones is a liar and—let me be clear—I have no
facts to support that conclusion.”
For reasons discussed above, to the extent that Milkovich suggests
that all accusations of lying imply the existence of undisclosed facts,
the decision is simply wrong. But there is still work to do even if we
understand the Court to make the more limited claim that some
such accusations do so. We need criteria for determining when an
accusation of lying signals the existence of such facts and when it
does not. Milkovich may provide an example even if it does not pro-
vide criteria—if everyone who was present at the wrestling match
would have known that Milkovich was lying at the hearing, and if
Diadiun was present at both the wrestling match and the hearing,
then he has undisclosed, detailed information that supports his
conclusion. Indeed, that is what Diadiun appeared to have
claimed.120 But under what other circumstances will the principle
apply? Or, to put it differently, under what circumstances will the
principle not apply, since we assume that almost every sane person
has at least some factual basis for their opinions, including an opin-
ion that someone is a liar?
Milkovich’s lack of clarity on this point has prompted some inter-
esting results in the lower courts. Consider, for example, Greene v.
State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections.121 In that case, the defendant called
the plaintiff a “pathological liar” with no context given.122 One
could read Milkovich to suggest that such a statement necessarily
119. Messenger, The Problem with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 221–22
(obligation of audience to not assume statements are true without basis), 229–32 (discussing
presumptions that should be made and the obligation to ask for clarification when state-
ments are ambiguous).
120. See supra note 10.
121. Greene v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 21 So. 3d 348 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
122. Id. at 350.
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implies knowledge of facts supportive of the judgment. But the
lower court ruled that—absent any evidence showing that the state-
ment was based on facts—an audience would and should presume
it is merely a “subjective” viewpoint.123 In other words, the lower
court constructed a default position: unless the statement claims a
factual basis, we take it to be a subjective opinion that can be
proven neither true nor false. We will return later to the Greene
court’s approach in this regard.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR WAYS FORWARD
Milkovich suffers from a number of conceptual infirmities and
has been roundly criticized for them.124 In large measure, however,
it has not wrought much mischief in the lower courts. As discussed,
its major doctrinal shift (disclaiming the longstanding interpreta-
tion of Gertz) and its specific holding (that an accusation of lying is
a statement of fact) have had very little influence on the substance
and direction of defamation law. Nevertheless, concerns remain
and the post-Milkovich jurisprudence of liar libel must be directed
in ways that address them.
A. What Does the Accuser Know?
Consider the cases like McNamee where something either is or is
not the case—either McNamee injected Clemens with drugs or he
did not, and once we know the answer to that question then we will
know who is lying. This is pretty in theory but problematic in appli-
cation. Return to the example, cited at the beginning, of Cosby’s
lawyer. Yes, Cosby either did or did not drug and rape his accusers.
But many of the people offering opinions about those accusers—
his lawyer, his wife, and his fans, for example—cannot possibly
know the truth. Their accusation of lying means: “I know whom I
believe and I do not believe the accusers.” It does not mean: “I
know whom I believe because I know what happened.” This is a
critical distinction because the latter opinion points toward facts;
the former opinion just points to other opinions. We know the dif-
ference and we therefore credit them differently.
This distinction needs to be incorporated in the post-Milkovich
jurisprudence of liar libel. It is critical that courts continue to apply
123. Id. at 352.
124. See, e.g., Richard H. Weisberg, The First Amendment Degraded: Milkovich v. Lorain and
A Continuing Sense of Loss on its 20th Birthday, 62 S.C. L. REV. 157 (2010).
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the sort of language- and context-driven analysis that was developed
after Gertz and that, in doing so, they distinguish accusations by
those who can claim personal knowledge from accusations by those
who cannot.125 A failure to embrace this distinction leaves law and
language strangely, and dangerously, disconnected.
B. How Much Certainty Does the Accuser Claim?
As discussed above, Milkovich noted that the mere addition of the
phrases “I think” or “in my opinion” does not transform statements
that are clearly factual into subjective expressions of viewpoint. This
is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go very far. After all, the
addition of such phrases can confirm that something that presents
as an opinion is indeed intended to be just that. For example, the
statement, “In my opinion Calvin Coolidge was a lousy President,”
twice signals that it is subjective—once by using the evaluative term
“lousy” and once by expressly framing the statement as an opinion.
Furthermore, the addition of such phrases can clarify that some-
thing that might—or might not—be an opinion is intended as
such. The Supreme Court recently acknowledged as much in the
different context of securities law. In Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist.
Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund,126 the Court held that the
words “We believe” made clear that an affirmation of compliance
with the law was subjective and tentative rather than objective and
certain. The same analysis should apply in the defamation context,
where the use of such phrases can provide dispositive clarification.
C. What Sort of Basis Does the Accuser Cite or Imply?
Courts should also proceed with caution in implementing
Milkovich’s suggestion that an accusation of lying that indicates
knowledge of supporting facts should be treated as a factual state-
ment.127 Granted, in cases that look just like Milkovich—that is, in
cases where the speaker clearly indicates that a factual basis for the
125. Epistemologists generally agree that a person cannot convey knowledge of some-
thing unless they themselves have knowledge of it. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY 6
(Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006). Although there may be a
debate about what is required to obtain “knowledge,” we think that in the context of libel
law, one cannot assume that a speaker has knowledge of facts unless they are affirmatively
stated and supported with credible evidence. In the absence of such conditions, statements
should be presumed to be mere opinion and protected speech.
126. 135 U.S. 1318 (2015).
127. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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accusation exists—this may be the correct approach. But Milkovich
must be limited to that narrow (and, we suspect, relatively rare)
class of cases in order to keep it from undermining critical First
Amendment values. Several considerations confirm that this is so.
As an initial matter, it must be recognized that in an expansive
sense all accusations of lying imply that they have some basis. This
characteristic alone does not, however, transform something that a
reader or listener would take as an expression of opinion into a
statement of fact. This is easily demonstrated by reference to other
kinds of statements that clearly qualify as opinions. Statements that
“Jane is an unpleasant person to be around” or that “Ted has bad
taste in ties” are clearly subjective expressions of viewpoint that can-
not be proven true or false. At the same time, in both cases the
speaker believes—and implies—that he or she has some basis for
holding the opinion expressed. Nevertheless, the basis for those
statements is the speaker’s subjective interpretation of or judg-
ments about facts, not the facts themselves. For example, if Ted
consistently wears striped ties and the speaker thinks stripes are aes-
thetically displeasing, the statement has a factual basis (the fact that
Ted wears striped ties), but whether that fact is disclosed or not is
immaterial. Indeed, even if the speaker were to add “and I have
reasons to think so” or “and if you knew what I knew I think you
would agree” to their statement this would not morph them into
declarations of fact.
This principle also needs to be incorporated into the post-
Milkovich jurisprudence of liar libel. In assessing whether an accusa-
tion of lying is actionable, it is insufficient for the court to note that
the speaker stated or implied that he or she had a basis for the
accusation. The court must assess the kind of basis the speaker
claimed. To the extent statements are based in judgments about
facts, rather than facts vel non, the accusation should be deemed
non-actionable.
Even where a speaker claims a factual basis for their accusation,
however, courts will still need to look closely at context. As dis-
cussed above, where those factual bases are disclosed and are
accurate then the conclusion should be non-actionable as a fair
comment.128 But even that should not end the court’s analysis.
There are many instances where an accusation of lying is just a
subjective expression of opinion even though the speaker points to
facts and even though some or all of those facts may be false. Take,
for example, the speaker who makes the following statement: “I
think John Jones lied about the number of times he has come to
128. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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work late. I have never seen him come in late or get chewed out by
our boss, but Jane says he comes in late all the time.” Does this
statement point toward a factual basis? Yes. Is the factual basis true?
Let’s assume not—let’s assume that Jane was innocently wrong or
maliciously deceitful in her description of John’s attendance.
Would most listeners take this as an objective statement of fact
rather than as a subjective evaluation? We seriously doubt it. In our
view, this statement would and should be taken to mean what it
says: “I’ve got a view on something, but it’s not particularly well-
informed and it’s based on hearsay that might be bad.” If anyone
takes such a statement as factual, then this says more about the gul-
libility of the listener than the meaning intended by the speaker.
A literal application of Milkovich, however, could result in the
nonsensical decision that this mushy expression of a subjective view-
point was both intended and understood to convey a fact-based
demonstrable truth. Fortunately, the lower court decisions gener-
ally embody a more holistic, nuanced, and thoughtful approach to
the complexities of language than a wooden application of
Milkovich brings with it. It is critical that courts continue to follow
that more complex model in the post-Milkovich jurisprudence of
liar libel.
Given all of this complexity, it is also critical that courts take a
cue from Greene and recognize the appropriate default position in
cases of uncertainty.129 Under Hepps, which shapes the better parts
of the Court’s reasoning in Milkovich, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving a materially false statement of fact.130 In cases where it is
unclear whether the statement at issue could be proven false, courts
should err on the side of protecting speech and should conclude
that the statement is not actionable. This principle follows straight-
forwardly from the allocation of the burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
Milkovich is a cautionary tale told in four acts. The first act oc-
curred in the immediate aftermath of the decision. Milkovich might
have been (mis)understood as effectuating a broad doctrinal shift
away from the protection of opinions. It became evident early on,
however, that the lower courts were not going to fall into this error.
129.  See supra text accompanying note 121–124.
130. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 (1986).
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Media defense lawyers reframed their opinion arguments as rhetor-
ical hyperbole arguments and most courts simply continued to
apply the same standard they had post-Gertz.
The second act played out as the lower courts encountered cases
of liar libel. This could have yielded a critical mass of superficially
reasoned lower court decisions finding that accusations of lying
were statements of fact. This did not happen either. For the most
part, lower courts have done a good job in bringing to the state-
ments in question the sort of nuanced and context-driven analysis
required.
The next act in this drama is being performed before us now, as
public accusations of lying go through their heyday. Whether the
lower courts can sustain the detailed and disciplined approach they
have generally taken to this issue remains to be seen. We hope that
this Article makes a modest contribution to their efforts to get it
right.
The final act of the drama will come when the Supreme Court
has its next opportunity to explore language, truth, and the con-
nections between them in the law of defamation. The Court has
struggled with this in the past, which has resulted in criticism not
only of Milkovich but even of pro-speech decisions like New York
Times v. Sullivan.131 In its next foray into this territory the Court
needs to remain mindful of the complexities of speech and truth
and of the dangers of making broad and generalized pronounce-
ments of what the former means and of how we know when we are
encountering a claim to the latter. And, of course, the Court must
fashion its jurisprudence in a way that gives speech the necessary
breathing space; that recognizes—in the words of Salman
Rushdie—that “language is courage”;132 and that assiduously avoids
creating rules or endorsing principles that encourage timidity, self-
censorship, and that greatest enemy of democracy, silence.
131. Messenger, supra note 4.
132. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES 290 (1988)
